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CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA 
 j ude  h owell 
 This chapter reviews the development of civil society in China since the start of 
economic reforms in the late 1970s, and analyzes the key constraints and opportuni-
ties shaping its past and future development. It argues that market reforms, subse-
quent socioeconomic changes, and technological and political factors have shaped 
the trajectory of civil society since 1978. Leadership concerns about political control 
and stability have been the overriding constraint on the full ﬂ ourishing of civic 
organizing in China, leading to incremental cycles of expansion and contraction. 
 The term civil society is used here to describe the realm of independent citizen 
organizing around shared concerns and interests. It is thus distinct from the state 
and the market, though in practice the boundaries between these three domains are 
blurred and messy. This is particularly the case in China, where the state continues 
to wield considerable power and authority over society. Empirically, the realm of 
civil society encompasses a range of action and organising that varies in degrees of 
formality and legality. At one end of the spectrum it includes organizations that are 
closely related to the Communist Party such as the All-China Federation of Trades 
Unions (ACFTU) or government-sponsored nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs); in the middle of the spectrum are more independent organizations with 
legal status such as professional associations or business associations; and further 
along the continuum lie more loosely organized, nonregistered networks, salons, 
and discussion groups. At the far end of this spectrum are illegal organizations, 
some of which would not enjoy legal status anywhere such as criminal gangs, traf-
ﬁ cking networks, and drug cartels; and others which are prohibited for political 
reasons such as secessionist movements and religious sects that would be more 
likely to be tolerated in a liberal democratic polity. 
 The chapter begins by outlining the development of civil society in the post-
Mao era. It then analyzes the social, economic, technological, and political fac-
tors that have shaped the contours of civil society. In particular it examines those 
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variables that underpin the expansion of civil society spaces and those that have 
contributed to their contraction or stagnation. The chapter ends by considering 
the future prospects for civil society development in China. 
 1. The Development of Civil Society 
in China After 1978 
 In the three decades before the launch of market reforms in 1978, the state exerted 
tight control over the spaces for independent civic organizing. After Liberation in 
1949 and years of civil war, the newly triumphant Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
needed to consolidate its power, reconstruct the economy, and minimize both inter-
nal and external threats to its rule. The Cold War led not only to the economic 
blockade of China but also to its political isolation from the capitalist West, aggra-
vated further by China’s gradual break with the Soviet Union from the late 1950s 
onwards. The long enduring Cold War fostered increasing economic self-reliance 
along Maoist lines as well as the maintenance of tight societal controls through 
ideological and organizational means. 
 A key element of societal control was the establishment of intermediary orga-
nizations linking the party to society. These mass organizations served to transmit 
party policy downwards to key constituencies of society such as youth, workers, and 
women, and in turn reﬂ ect their views upwards to the party, thereby in theory real-
ising the principles of democratic socialism. The largest such mass organizations 
were the All-China Federation of Women (ACWF), the ACFTU, and the Communist 
Youth League (CYL) 1 . These intermediary organizations formed an integral part of 
the Leninist style sociopolitical architecture of Maoist China, with their ofﬁ ces, 
staff, and activities being supported by the party-state. Apart from these key inter-
mediary institutions, the work unit ( danwei) and the rural commune were also key 
sites through which the party exerted control over society. As a result of the penetra-
tion of the state into the everyday life of Chinese society, there was little room for 
citizens to organize spontaneously or independently. Though occasional protests 
took place, such as the workers’ protests in Shanghai in 1957 ( Perry  1994 ), they were 
sharply put down, stymieing further collective action. 
 With the rise to power in 1978 of market-oriented reformers led by Deng 
Xiaoping, the economic and social infrastructure of Maoist China underwent fun-
damental transformation. The diversiﬁ cation of ownership systems, the relaxation 
of controls over rural-urban migration, the expansion of foreign trade, the intro-
duction of foreign investment, and the dismantling of the rural commune system 
led to the pluralization of interests, and thereby increased social differentiation and 
stratiﬁ cation. Aware that the old systems for connecting with society—and in par-
ticular the mass organizations—were no longer adequate for reaching out to an 
increasingly complex society, from the late 1980s onwards the reformers began to 
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encourage the development of new forms of association. These included, for exam-
ple, trades associations, professional associations, learned societies, cultural and 
sports clubs, chambers of commerce, and business associations. A key protagonist 
of this opening up of space was the well-known economist Xue Muqiao. In an arti-
cle written in 1988 he argued that as the state took on a more indirect role in eco-
nomic management, so certain functions previously carried out by the state could 
be passed over to traders and business people. These economic associations could 
then “serve as a bridge between the state and enterprises.” 
 From the mid-1980s onwards, new social organizations ( shehui zuzhi ) mush-
roomed across China. It was against this background that China-watchers intro-
duced the concept of “civil society” into their analysis ( White, Howell, and Shang 
 1996 ;  Gold  1990 ;  Gu  1993 /4;  He  1997 ;  Huang  1993 ;  Rowe  1993 ;  Sullivan  1990 ). In doing 
so, many sought not just to use the term to describe a sociological phenomenon of 
increasing civic organization, but also to express a normative aspiration that such a 
development might herald the democratization of China. The embracing of this 
concept, moreover, reﬂ ected broader global trends whereby popular democratic 
movements in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa had led to the overthrow 
of unpopular, authoritarian regimes. Indeed, East European scholars were the ﬁ rst 
to revitalize the idea of civil society to articulate their vision of a more democratic 
polity and society ( Keane  1988 ). 
 The growth of social organizations reached a peak in the late 1980s, when the 
spread of China’s democracy movement and the subsequent government clamp-
down in June 1989 brought their proliferation to a rapid halt. The party prohibited 
all organizations deemed a threat to its continued rule, such as the various autono-
mous students’ unions and trades unions. The crackdown on protestors in 
Tiananmen Square on June 4 led Western observers to be far more cautious in 
declaring the emergence of a civil society in China and in predicting democratic 
regime change. 
 In October 1989, the party began to assert greater order over the sphere of social 
organizations by issuing new Management Regulations on the Registration of Social 
Organizations, replacing the 1950 regulations. These made the process of registra-
tion more complex and demanding, with prospective social organizations now 
required not only to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) but also to 
identify a supervisory unit ( guakao danwei ) that would act as their sponsor and be 
responsible for supervising the activities of the appended social organization. The 
new regulations sought to establish a corporatist framework for governing social 
organizations, limiting, for example, the number of associations in any one domain 
to only one. 2 The issuing of the 1989 regulations clearly slowed the pace of growth 
of registered social organizations. 
 The tight grip of the party over society began to yield in the early 1990s as mar-
ket reformers began to gain the upper hand over the more ideologically conserva-
tive elements of the party. Deng Xiao Ping’s tour of Southern China in 1992 marked 
this subtle shift in power and heralded a further deepening of economic reform. It 
was within this context of political easing that the seeds of a new phase in the 
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 development of civil society were sown. Two outstanding features distinguished this 
new phase of development: ﬁ rst, the proliferation of associations addressing the 
needs and interests of social groups marginalized in the reform process; and second, 
the growth of new forms of association that skillfully bypassed the need to register 
as social organizations ( Howell  2003 ). In the 1980s and early 1990s the majority of 
registered social organizations were found in the realms of academia, business, 
trades, culture, sports, arts, and professional interests. There were relatively few 
independent organizations that concerned themselves with issues of poverty, social 
disadvantage, or marginalization, or with public affairs. Pei’s (1998) analysis of a 
sample of social organizations found that national-level charitable groups and 
foundations increased from two in 1978 to only sixteen in 1992, making up just two 
percent of all registered national social organizations. The paucity of charitable 
groups and foundations was due in part to the ongoing provision of basic social 
welfare through the urban state and collective sectors, albeit uneven in coverage. 
Though the production process had been opened up to private investment, both 
domestic and international, there was no for-proﬁ t or not-for-proﬁ t private sector 
in welfare provision. 
 From the early 1990s onwards, a new stratum of organizations emerged that 
sought to address the needs and interests of those who were vulnerable and margin-
alized in the reform processes. These associations took up issues such as HIV/AIDS, 
domestic violence, poverty, disability, migrant workers’ rights, health and safety, 
and environment and industrial pollution. Since not all of these organizations are 
registered, establishing precise ﬁ gures is not possible. Nevertheless, available evi-
dence points to several hundreds by the end of the 1990s ( China Development Brief 
 2001 ). Though this stratum of organizing has developed rapidly in the 1990s, their 
numbers remain limited, especially for groups such as sex workers or people living 
with HIV/AIDS, who face much social prejudice. 
 The second distinguishing feature of civil society from the mid-1990s onwards 
relates to the dynamic ingenuity of some Chinese citizens in bypassing the registra-
tion process. In November 1998 the party-state made further revisions to the regula-
tions on social organization in an attempt to gain further control over the 
associational sphere. As a result the number of registered social organizations fell 
from 220,000 in 1998 to 136,841 in 2000, almost a third less than the 181,060 groups 
registered in 1993. Nevertheless this did not stop people from ﬁ nding ways to orga-
nize around shared concerns. These included afﬁ liating as second- or third-level 
bodies to a registered, established association, thereby obviating the need to regis-
ter; forming networks that got around the regulatory restriction on forming branch 
organizations; organizing through projects sponsored often by foreign donors; 
meeting informally through salons, clubs, and loose networks; setting up research 
institutes and centers under the protective cover of universities; and registering as 
nonproﬁ t companies with the Industrial and Commercial Bureau. In this way 
dynamic people maneuvered around the regulatory regime, recapturing associa-
tional space and pushing back the barriers that the party had tried to impose. 
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 These two features of civil society in China have continued into the new millen-
nium. At the same time, the party has introduced new laws to promote foundations 
and charities. It has also further parsed out registered organizations, dividing them 
into social organizations, foundations, and nonproﬁ t enterprises, each with its own 
corresponding set of regulations. Apart from these registered entities the realm of 
nonregistered organizing has remained alive, provided it stays within the limits of 
acceptable activity as deﬁ ned by the party. Nevertheless, there have been three key 
moments in the ﬁ rst decade of the new millennium that have prompted seemingly 
contradictory state responses of restriction and promotion. 
 The ﬁ rst of these relates to the more general global backlash against civil society 
that was becoming apparent at the turn of the millennium ( Carothers  2006 ,  Howell 
et al.  2007 ). A number of parallel trends were converging in the late 1990s to raise 
concerns about the probity, accountability, and legitimacy of nongovernmental 
organizations. These concerns gained increasing salience following the launch of 
President George W. Bush’s “war on terror,” which cast suspicion on charities as 
entities that were vulnerable to misuse by terrorist groups ( Howell and Lind  2009 ). 
At the same time, President Vladimir Putin was also becoming increasingly con-
cerned about the role of foreign-funded NGOs in national political processes. In 
particular he suggested that the Colour Revolutions that had occurred in the 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan were in part engineered by Western-sponsored 
democracy and rights groups. Putin’s concerns caused alarm amongst China’s polit-
ical leaders, who from late spring 2005 quietly set about investigating international 
NGOs, foundations, and foreign-funded local nongovernmental groups. Part of 
this effort involved a review of NGOs that had registered under the Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau so as to avoid the more stringent requirements of the MOCA, 
and led to the closure of several NGOs deemed politically sensitive. 
 The second key moment was the boost given to volunteering and government 
perceptions of nongovernmental organizations in the aftermath of the earthquake 
in Sichuan province in 2008 ( Teets  2009 ). This event brought into sharp relief the 
Janus-like response of the party to collective action in China: on the one hand, the 
party welcomed the contribution that volunteers and nongovernmental agencies 
could make in emergency relief situations, adopting as a result a more constructive 
approach towards such independent organizing. On the other hand, the party 
recoiled at spontaneous initiatives that criticized local government ofﬁ cials for cor-
ruption, which they saw as underpinning the poor quality of school construction. 
As a result, journalists, parents’ groups, and dynamic, critical individuals encoun-
tered the heavy hand of the state in response to their calls for accountability and 
transparency, and their attempts to stimulate a public discussion about 
corruption. 
 The third key moment that shaped civil society’s recent development were the 
Olympic Games, which were held in Beijing in 2008. Concerned about potential 
terrorist attacks and protests, 3 the party had already taken various measures in 
preparing for the Olympics to ensure the smooth running of the event. Internet 
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cafes were closed down; websites blocked; human rights lawyers such as Teng Biao, 
who had defended AIDS activists and Falun Gong practitioners, were detained, 
and dissidents such as Hu Jia, a civic rights and AIDS campaigner, quickly removed 
from sight. The outbreak of demonstrations in Tibet in March 2008 led to a crack-
down on protestors and monasteries in the province, enhanced surveillance of 
websites, and attacks in the media on the inﬂ uence of external Tibetan campaigns. 
In addition, attempts to thwart the progress of the Olympic ﬂ ame around the 
world so as to draw attention to issues such as Tibet, the Falun Gong ( Ostergaard 
 2003 ) and secessionist struggles in Xinjiang province fuelled party leaders’ con-
cerns that external forces were seeking to interfere in China’s affairs and destabilize 
the country. 
 The development of civil society over the last three decades has thus been char-
acterized by cycles of contraction and expansion, with each cycle representing a 
gradual widening of associational space. Nevertheless the boundaries of what is 
possible continue to be contested and negotiated. Organizing around certain issues 
such as secession in Tibet or Xinjiang, legalization of the Falun Gong, democratic 
regime change, or independent trades unions remains out of bounds. In the next 
section I look at the combination of factors that have underpinned this incremen-
tal, cyclical pattern of civil society development. 
 2. Explaining Cycles of Contraction 
and Expansion 
 How can one account for this incremental, cyclical pattern of civil society develop-
ment in China? Answering this question requires an understanding both of the eco-
nomic, social, and political factors that have prompted citizen organizing and 
government tolerance, and of the forces that have constrained the expansion of civil 
society organizing. The ﬁ rst point to make is that market reformers recognized the 
need to open up intellectual spaces so that scientiﬁ c and knowledge from the West 
could be used to accelerate economic growth. The reinvigoration of the China 
Association for Science and Technology and the growth of learned societies, profes-
sional associations, and academic associations reﬂ ect this drive to promote mod-
ernization and fundamental economic change. 
 Second, as the reforms deepened in the 1990s, the institutional architecture of 
social welfare was also gradually dismantled. In particular, the intensiﬁ cation of 
state enterprise reform from the mid-1990s onwards led to the streamlining and 
closure of state enterprises, 4 bringing in its wake the laying off of millions of work-
ers ( Lee  2007 ). The diversiﬁ cation of ownership systems along with state enterprise 
reform weakened the work unit ( danwei ) both as a site of political and ideological 
control over society and as a system for providing social welfare. Employees in state 
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enterprises, particularly larger ones, had typically enjoyed guaranteed life employ-
ment, pensions, and access to schooling and health care, crèches, and kindergartens. 
With the introduction of the market and increasingly competitive pressures on the 
state sector, these systemic advantages have been gradually eroded. In response the 
party-state has gradually, albeit slowly, introduced new systems of social security, 
pensions, and social and medical insurance ( Chan et al.  2008 ). However, migrant 
workers remain poorly covered by these schemes, while access to healthcare has 
become an increasingly divisive marker in society (Yao 2005). 
 The processes of state enterprise restructuring and social welfare reform have 
provided a context in which the CCP has recognized the need for a more diverse 
portfolio of service providers. Provincial governments across China have experi-
mented with community-based social welfare provision and have welcomed the 
activities of newly established nongovernmental welfare groups, especially where 
these address sensitive issues such as HIV/AIDS that local governments ﬁ nd more 
difﬁ cult to deal with openly ( Howell  2003 ). Furthermore, the service sector has also 
functioned as a way to absorb excess labor and workers laid off in the process of 
state enterprise reform. Awareness among party and government leaders of the 
potential contribution of nongovernmental organizations and voluntary activity to 
welfare issues was further heightened in the Sichuan earthquake of 2008. As volun-
teers from all over China raised money for earthquake victims and travelled to 
Sichuan to assist in relief operations, ofﬁ cial appreciation and acceptance of the 
merits and utility of citizen action was strengthened. This not only reinvigorated 
discussions around creating a more enabling legal and regulatory framework for 
nongovernmental service-oriented organizations to operate, but also crystallized a 
picture of citizen action that was acceptable to the party—namely, a service- oriented, 
apolitical “harmonious” civil society. 
 The third factor favoring the expansion of nongovernmental initiatives was the 
need to address the increasingly diverse and differentiated interests that had emerged 
in China as a result of market reforms. With the weakening of the  danwei system, 
the development of a private sector, and the deepening of state enterprise reforms, 
relying on the old mass organizations as the main intermediary channel between 
the party and society became increasingly inadequate. Though the mass organiza-
tions have adapted their structures, approach, and activities to relate to their increas-
ingly complex and ﬂ uid constituencies more effectively, the need for new interests 
to ﬁ nd organizational expression was important for ensuring social stability and 
government control over society. 
 Technological change has also fuelled both the opening up of political space 
and the ferocity of state resistance. In 2009 there were over 384 million Internet 
users in China. 5 While the party has developed sophisticated means for blocking 
websites, blogs, and interactive media, such as the 2003 Golden Shield project, 
Chinese “netizens” have also become increasingly adept at circumventing and 
resisting these controls. For example, the well-known artist Ai Weiwei, who 
designed the beehive stadium for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, rallied Chinese neti-
zens to stay ofﬂ ine on July 1, 2009 in response to the party’s plans to introduce the 
166 geographical perspectives
new Green Dam Youth Escort censorship software into all new computers. Faced 
with widespread domestic criticism, the government backed down, declaring the 
uploading of the software as optional. Given the horizontal linkages that the 
Internet fosters both domestically and internationally, this will continue to be an 
important battleground shaping the limits of intellectual expression and mobiliza-
tion in China. 
 Finally, China’s engagement internationally has been a key spur to the devel-
opment of civil society, 6 as illustrated, for example, by the rapid growth of more 
independent women’s organizations in the run-up to China’s hosting of the Fourth 
World Conference for Women in 1995 ( Howell  1997 ). Women across China began 
to set up salons, associations, and gender research groups, addressing the increas-
ingly diverse interests and needs of women and promoting a gender analysis 
approach. The ACWF began to describe itself as an NGO and set about establish-
ing new afﬁ liated social organizations under its umbrella. External players have 
also contributed to greater political tolerance for citizen organizing. Relevant here 
is the growing layer of international development organizations that began to 
operate in China from the 1990s onwards, supporting and encouraging the growth 
of local nongovernmental groups to implement development projects aimed at 
poverty reduction. 
 While a combination of factors has hastened the emergence of certain kinds of 
civil society organizations in China, political and social factors have also constrained 
the development of civil society. Aware of the destabilizing effects of rapid eco-
nomic reform and the growing socioeconomic and regional inequalities, party lead-
ers have kept a wary eye on citizen organizing, particularly at the time of key political 
events such as the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 or the sixtieth anniversary 
of CCP rule in October 2009. The party has consistently opposed any form of citi-
zen action around issues such as the separation of Tibet or Xinjiang from China; the 
Falun Gong; organizing independent trades unions; setting up alternative parties 
that challenge CCP rule; or initiatives calling for democracy. Moreover, the party’s 
tolerance for criticism is still crucially low. Two recent incidents testify to this. First, 
citizens who protested the poor quality of construction that led to the collapse of 
schools in the Sichuan earthquake have been harassed by security agencies. Second, 
in the wake of the 2008 milk powder scandal, human rights lawyers and parents 
seeking compensation and disclosure of state involvement have similarly been 
harassed by the state. How much the party is prepared to tolerate has been subject 
to ongoing contestation within the party, among academics, and by civil society 
actors who test the boundaries in various ways. Maintaining social stability has been 
a key concern and legitimizing discourse for the party in both clamping down on 
civil society actors and in proceeding at a snail-like pace with improving the regula-
tory and legal regime. 
 The corporatist legal and regulatory framework has also had a constraining 
effect on the development of a legally based civil society. By 2009 the party had 
put in place a range of legal and policy measures to guide the registration and 
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management of nongovernmental organizations. These included, for example, 
the 1998 Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of Popular 
Non-Enterprise Work-Units, the 1999 Law on Donations to Public Welfare 
Undertakings, the 2004 Regulations on the Management of Foundations and the 
2008 Enterprise Income Tax Law, making it easier for companies to donate to 
charities. However, a planned charity law still remains in draft form. Similarly 
plans since 2004 to permit the legal registration of foreign social organizations 
have continued to drag on, not least because of underlying suspicion about the 
political intent of such organizations. While the development of such a frame-
work testiﬁ es to the party’s recognition of the relevance of these nongovernmen-
tal groups, the measures themselves still remain a barrier to their legalization and 
public recognition. Hence the tendency since the late 1990s has been for many 
groups to bypass these measures in innovative ways, and for local governments to 
cast a blind eye, aware that these groups are harmless and/or useful in addressing 
local needs and interests. 
 Another factor constraining the development of civil society has been party 
leaders’ suspicion that external powers are trying to destabilize China. For example, 
during the July 2009 Xinjiang riots, the CCP accused Rebiya Kadeer, an exiled leader 
of the World Uighur Congress, of instigating the unrest. However China has also 
skillfully manipulated U.S. politics to counter secessionist tendencies in Xinjiang. 
After the U.S. government under President George W. Bush launched the so-called 
war on terror in 2001, China agreed to demonstrate its alliance with the United 
States in return for putting the East Turkestan Islamic Movement on the U.S. terror-
ist watch list. Chinese government suspicion of external inﬂ uences also lay behind 
the investigation of international NGOs and foreign-funded Chinese NGOs in the 
mid-2000s. 
 A further constraint has been the lack of understanding among political leaders 
and the public about the role of nongovernmental agencies. The general public has 
remained suspicious about the purpose and intent of nongovernmental organiza-
tions seeking to harness their time or money, which has made fundraising difﬁ cult. 
A scandal surrounding the Project Hope campaign in the late 1990s did little to 
instill public conﬁ dence. In the run-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women 
the ACWF began to refer to itself as a nongovernmental agency, even though ACWF 
cadres at the time were not very clear about what a nongovernmental organization 
was, nor whether they were themselves governmental or nongovernmental, not 
least because many so-called nongovernmental organizations have often been sup-
ported by the state in terms of ofﬁ ce space, equipment, and sometimes staff; some 
have been initiated by central and local governments; and some have very close con-
nections with state ofﬁ cials at different levels ( Chan  1993  Unger  2008 , White, Howell 
and Shang  1996 ). Still, to suggest that civil society does not exist in China because of 
a lack of autonomy from the government fails to capture the dynamism and initia-
tive that has come from independent actors driven to organize around a need, inter-
est, or issue. Indeed, close cooperation with the state is a feature of many civil 
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societies around the world, particularly in relation to governmental contracting out 
of service provision to the non-for-proﬁ t sector, the United Kingdom being a prime 
example. 
 Finally, foreign investors and companies interested in staking a share in China’s 
domestic economy have also contributed to state controls over civil society, in part 
through their agreement to partake in censoring. For example, both Google and 
Yahoo signed agreements with the Chinese government to censor certain informa-
tion on their sites in China in order to secure access to the Chinese Internet market. 
However, in early 2010 Google declared that it would no longer agree to censorship 
controls over the ﬂ ow of information and websites. Though this move has garnered 
some domestic support, critics have condemned it as playing into the hands of the 
Chinese government by yielding space to alternative Chinese internet providers, 
who will willingly comply with government censorship demands. 
 3. Conclusion 
 The development of civil society in China has proceeded in an incremental, cyclical 
fashion, with periods of contraction followed by periods of expansion. Compared 
to the late 1970s when market reformers consolidated their power and embarked 
upon a fundamental program of economic reform, the spaces for independent 
organizing and the expression of ideas has widened considerably. Though the party 
maintains a tight hold over any organizing or expression of ideas that it deems 
threatening to social stability and the continuation of its rule, it is also increasingly 
receptive to the idea of a depoliticized, “third sector” of welfare-oriented social 
organizations, charities, and foundations. This incremental, cyclical pattern of 
development points to the ongoing contestation and negotiation of boundaries 
between state and civil society. In particular it highlights both the contradictory 
impulses of the party towards civil society organizing, and the growing resistance of 
civil society actors to restrictions on their freedoms of expression and association. 
 As China becomes more deeply integrated into the global economy and asser-
tive in global institutions, it will also become increasingly subject to international 
scrutiny. Global economic, cultural, and social linkages as well as the Internet will 
make it harder for the party to control the supply of information, analysis, and 
opinion. Political leaders’ concerns about social stability and potential threats to 
party rule will continue to drive a more restrictive approach to civil society organiz-
ing. At the same time, however, the need to address issues of social welfare and 
social inequality and to ﬁ nd new channels for the articulation of grievances calls for 
a more pragmatic and inclusive approach to governing society. Finding an effective 
way of addressing multiple, complex interests and channeling discontent will be 
crucial for the maintenance by the party of stability and its continued rule in 
China. 
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 NOTES 
 1. On the ACFTU see  Harper ( 1969 ) and  Taylor et al. ( 2003 ) and on the ACWF see 
 Davin ( 1976 ) and  Howell ( 1996 ). 
 2. The classic work on corporatism is by Philippe  Schmitter ( 1974 ). The concept has 
been applied to China by, for example,  Chan ( 1993 ),  Unger ( 1996 ,  2008 ), and  White, 
Howell, and Shang ( 1996 ). 
 3. For a detailed survey of collective protests in China see  Cheung et al.  2006 . 
 4. Between 2001 and 2005 the number of state-owned enterprises had fallen by 48 
percent (Du 2005). 
 5. See “China Internet Usage Stats and Population Report” in  Internet Usage and 
Population Stats ,  www.internetworldstats.com (accessed on February 7, 2010). 
 6. On the increasing internationalization of China, see  Zweig ( 2002 ). 
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